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After Deconstruction 
by Rodger Friedman 
Review-essay on Gianni Vattimo and Aldo Rovatti, eds. JI pensiero debole. Milano: 
Giangiacomo Feltrinelli Editore, 1983. 262pp. 
Post-structuralist philosophical writing in Italy, as elsewhere, 
is faced with taking seriously the thesis of "the end of philosophy" 
sketched earlier this century by Heidegger and continued in the 
work of Adorno, Benjamin, and on into the French 1970s. The 
thesis of the end of the parabola of Western philosophy (actually, 
the end of expository philosophical discourse) was conceived par-
tially in a polemical stance toward Western rational m~taphysics 
and toward the totalizing, systemic philosophies epitomized in 
Descartes, in Kant, and (more or less judiciously) in Plato, depend-
ing on the polemic involved. Philosophical writers in Italy find 
themselves in a position where the polemic has largely served its 
purpose. The restrictions inherent in the metaphysical undertak-
ing have been disclosed to the extent that further disclosure of 
the problem would not seem to obtain. Rather, late philosophical 
writing is testing its language to discover what, in the age of the 
end of philosophy, philosophy might become. In other words, 
the Italian philosophical community is occupied less now with 
deconstructing its metaphysical period than with finding out what 
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philosophy does in a fresh, nonmetaphysical mode. 
II pensiero debole is a collection of propositions and demonstra-
tions----theory and practice-by eleven philosophical writers of 
greater or lesser fame who do not cohere into a recognizable group, 
school, or party line. Professors Vattimo and Rovatti, in their joint 
introduction, call immediate attention to the collection's diverse 
theoretical orientations. The banner title, they say, unifies diverse 
authors 
whose common idea is that Italian discussions on the crisis of 
reason ... as well as several versions of French post-structuralism 
... manifest still too much nostalgia for metaphysics, and do not 
bring to its fullest consequence the experience of the forgetting of 
being, or of the death of God .... 
Even while formulating such an unbinding theoretical point of 
departure, the editors are quick to point out that it only holds for 
"many of the writers of these essays----not for all of them-and it 
is not in all ways equally valid even for those who recognize it." 
In fact, generalizations about "pensiero debole" are distinctly 
foreign to the idea of systemless "weak" philosophizing. 
Generally, however, Adorno's formulation (and Heidegger's 
sometime practice) that "philosophy dissolves into poetry" is being 
tested. "Poetic thinking" finds its practitioners in Leonardo 
Amoroso, Diego Marconi and Giampiero Comolli, and it has its 
theorists in Gianni Carchia, Alessandro Dal Lago, Gianni Vattimo. 
When philosophy dissolves into poetry, philosophy employs a 
degree of fictionality to disclose truth in a nonrational, lyric con-
templative mode. Fictionality in this case does not tend toward 
fabularity, as it did for some fifteenth- and sixteenth-century pro-
totype weak thinkers. Rather, it pursues a mode of discourse 
which wields the texture of language in a recursive, reflexive man-
ner. In order for philosophical language to present itself free of 
received stances, the language must itself be revised and retooled 
by each philosopher to intensify it for the purposes of the poetic-
philosophical voice. The poetic formulation is often contemplative 
in voice in order to reveal the dialogic relationship that exists 
between the philosopher and thinking, which takes on indepen-
dent status from the "subject" of thought. This shift in attitude 
toward contemplation is in sharp contrast to the deconstructive 
tendency of recent years in the dominant of French philosophical 
writing and American literary criticism. 
It has been pointed out popularly that some of the criticism 
that identifies itself as deconstructive has a tendency to express 
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itself in martial terms, beginning with the term "avant garde." 
We also hear of deconstruction as a "strategy," of disturbing a 
linguistic construction along its fault lines, of "inserting the lever 
of difference," and so on. The cumulative effect of this "strategy" 
results in "the imperialism of the signifier" on the one hand, and, 
on the other, the related mastery of the critic over the text. The 
critic does the text's signifying for it. The critic "attacks" the text, 
imperiously chisels open the gap between thing and word, and 
declares an absence, a hollowness at the center of language (with 
an implicit deep nostalgia for presence). Of course, this gesture 
drawing of deconstructive criticism oversimplifies it to the point 
of caricature. Nevertheless, philosophical writing about language 
and the literary criticism that has merged with it like a cartel seem 
to please critics with their new power over the text, with their 
new strategies against the text. As a by-product, critical writing 
has been freed to become very writerly. Writerly philosophy has 
its own anti-canonical history which bears pressure on it, and that 
history provides the antecedents to "pensiero debole." 
In ages when philosophy tends to define itself as an undertak-
ing whose business it is to make explicit the defining qualities of 
the totality of our life in the universe (that is, the tradition of 
metaphysics), its works take on the familiar transparent quality 
of prose. The definitions of words are honed to discrete precision. 
They direct the reader with a minimum of apparent mediation to 
the world of the clear referent. The works tend to be exhaustive 
in length. They index the world that the philosopher presents as 
the real world. That world is recreated for the reader in language. 
This is philosophy's epic mode. Its characteristic vehicle is 
the treatise or the summa, and it implies by its form, as Stephen 
Rendall points out, a finished, completed formulation of the truth. 
However, in ages when philosophy has tended to define itself 
as an undertaking whose responsibility it is to articulate a modus 
vivendi, it has commonly reached toward literary presentation and 
language that more or less draws attention to itself. In the Ren-
aissance and in Republican Rome, the dialogue is perhaps its 
commonest form, an open form that does not claim to present a 
universal, apodictic proof or to beat us over the head with rational 
conclusions; it dramatizes philosophical activity. Whatever exposi-
tory line a dialogist may present is presented through the fictional 
terms of dramatic representation in which the process of thinking 
is primary to conclusive thought. 
In Italy, the emergent directions of thinking would seem to 
confirm the historical trend, that philosophy in literary forms takes 
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on an ethical underpinning. In the introduction to Il pensiero debole, 
Vattimo and Rovatti outline what they call a "rather rhapsodic" 
list of coordinates which may define the directions of weak think-
ing. They call for a manner of thinking that will "take seriously 
the nexus between metaphysical evidence and the relationships 
of power outside and within the subject." Note that they use the 
word "nesso," nexus, connection, where a Derridian would use 
"gap" or "hollowness" or "absence." The essayists of Il pensiero 
debole characteristically postulate ontological presence where less 
ethically minded thinking finds absence. The editors would also 
warn against declining weak thinking into a systemic philosophy 
of emancipation based on hermeneutical "smascheramento," on 
"unmasking," that is, on transference of the power of the signifier 
to the signifying critic. Rather, they would let it function as a 
new, friendly look at the world of appearances, procedures of dis-
course and symbolic forms as possible location for the experience 
of Being, not in the direction of Deleuze's "frenzy of the simulacrum 
liberated from every reference," but in a direction of thought cap-
able of articulating itself in the half-light. 
("Half-light" is a Heideggerian metaphor for the locus of the dis-
closure of Being in an incidence of Lichtung, like light in a forest 
that is filtered through the moving branches of trees.) Pensiero 
debole, then, would never be a system (like structuralism) or a 
party line, but merely an approach to the world as it is seen, using 
Heidegger's "identification of language and Being as a mode of 
encountering Being anew in the form of trace and memory, con-
sumed and weakened." 
According to this formulation, language can be used as a way 
to intensify sensibility of Being, and as a mode of adjusting and 
realizing the dialogic relationship inherent in that sensibility. 
Dialogue itself, in fact, becomes an ethical responsibility . The 
philosopher can no longer afford to attack; the philosopher has 
to negotiate. 
In an essay which attempts to put pensiero debole into relief 
against the kind of thinking characterized as dialectic or as differ-
ence, Vattimo's language is pointedly unmilitaristic. Rather, he 
manipulates the language of ethics. Referring himself to Walter 
Benjamin's obsession with Paul Klee's Angelus Novus, an angel 
"moved by great pity for the ruins that history accumulates at its 
feet, for everything that could have been and wasn't or isn't any 
more, that didn't produce historical effects," Vattimo appropriates 
the term pietas along with Heidegger's An-denken and Verwindung 
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to characterize pensiero debole. Pietas toward the absences of the 
past along with a "friendly" regard for the "world of appearances, 
procedures of discourse and symbolic forms" cast pensiero debole 
into an ethical stance toward the possibility of philosophizing. 
Vattimo, in fact, speaks of an "ethic of weakness" in thought. 
This weakness can be understood as the act of thinking without 
a program, without a theory to save, without applying the ten 
categories to experience. It is hermeneutics without a hermeneutic 
key. What makes it "debole" or "weak" is its lack of a skeletal 
framework within which to operate. Thus, pensiero debole does 
not refer to debilitating the role of philosophy in the world, as 
Mario Perniola seems to interpret it in his "Lettera a Gianni Vat-
timo" (bibl.). Rather, it prescribes an ethic for philosophizing that 
would debilitate philosophy's relation with its subject matter from 
one of dominance to one of interaction, of dialogue. 
By trying to work outside of a theoretical cornice, Vattimo 
sees pensiero debole as achieving a suppleness and a capability 
for perceiving detail that would be unknown from a strong, struc-
tural approach to thinking. "It's enough to observe," he says, 
how many fields and objects can be-in fact, must be-€xcluded 
by a totalizing inquiry. The price paid by strong reasoning is an 
impressive limitation of the objects that can be seen and discussed. 
That is, a hermeneutic key automatically assimilates its objects into 
its framework, thus inevitably distorting them for the purpose. 
Vattimo seems to be calling for an ethics of contemplation, 
study and response. The critic ought to pipe down, reduce domi-
nance over the text or risk drowning it out, losing what the text 
has to offer. The critic, in fact, should respond to the text as if he 
were a lyric poet with the scope of disclosing aestheticplly, intui-
tively, the ineffable realm of Being, conceived as absence that falls 
between subject and object, between word and thing. The pro-
posal would seem to reverse forever the expulsion of the poets 
from Plato's philosophical utopia by promoting the total integra-
tion of philosophical and lyric discourse. The manner in which 
thought can approach Being, not as an entity but in a way 
which "lets Being be," is the An-denken and pietas, with poetry as 
an agent. In a postmodern Republic, all philosophers would be 
poets, throwing language to "its own extreme limits, where it 
becomes marooned in silence," as Vattimo says elsewhere. Posed 
in such language of paradox and oxymoron, the appropriation of 
poetic language by philosophers makes operable an aesthetic 
response to thinking that, in differentiation from epic or even 
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dramatic forms of philosophy, might be called "lyric thing," a 
passable translation of the concept behind the expression "il 
pensiero de bole." 
One of the more interesting essays in Il pensiero debole 
exemplifies the process of thinking. Giampiero Comolli' s essay is 
called: "Quando sul paese innevato silenziosamente appare il 
Castello (la propensione narrativa di fronte al paesaggio inenar-
rabile ), " [When in the snowy landscape the Castle suddenly 
appears (the tendency to narrate before the unsayable landscape)]. 
Comolli spells out a succession of thoughts, a line of thinking, 
that occurred to him one evening on a delayed train in the Brenner 
pass, when the snowy landscape became charged up with the 
landscape of Kafka's The Castle. Comolli's essay is elaborate with 
literary device. The narrative present of the essay is the moment 
that the protagonist, the theorizing "I," is delayed on the train. 
That narrative present reverberates with the setting of Kafka's 
novel, and the essay proceeds to follow the fiction of the author 
thinking his way across the gap he perceives between his own 
present moment and that of The Castle. 
Comolli dramatizes a significant shift in attitude from a decon-
structive analysis of Kafka. The protagonist feigns to have left the 
book at home. Of the text he has only what he can remember, 
only what has been appropriated by the protagonist himself be-
tween his present self and the self-dimensionalized K., Comolli 
discovers a gap between the two, an aspect of landscape that he 
cannot symbolize and that he cannot see. He finds there a "zona 
vuota," an empty area, which eventually becomes the focus of 
his contemplation. The zona vuota, discursively present in The 
Castle as well as in the protagonist's thinking, enlarges with con-
templation, and becomes an unhearable message: 
In fact the message is destined to remain unhearable or bette r, 
uninterpretable, to the end . Its whisper is heard, its light breath, 
but these sounds . .. cannot be described and interpreted by the 
narrating subject except as silence . The whisper interpreted, trans-
lated into signified, is only silence.But it is a silence which makes 
one listen, that sustains, that makes the heart tremble, a nothing 
that nevertheless is [un nulla che pero c'e]. 
Like a deconstructor, Comolli has opened the gap of language 
and experience, but he has found there a presence to contemplate, 
not merely an absence to dominate. Vattimo's pietas asks the val-
uation of that empty space (what chassidim call "the white letters 
of Torah") not as a neoplatonic truth that is prior to language, 
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but as an unarticulated (and unarticulatable) portion of the "hori-
zon of language" into which Heidegger says we are thrown, a 
glow that shows up in language but which language cannot reach. 
As philosophy turns lyric, that ground of Being which subject 
and object share may not be so imperiously drowned out. 
